Why Kenyan crude will be exported and not domestically refined

Mombasa refinery
Source: http://mygov.go.ke/national-treasury-sets-aside-funds-to-buy-essar-stake-in-refinery/

Kenya currently has no crude oil production and relies solely on imports to feed the domestic refinery in Mombasa. Aside from feedstock for the refinery, there is no other demand for crude oil in Kenya.

In 2012, domestic consumption of refined products was 73mbbl/d – this was satisfied by 20mbbl/d of domestic production from the refinery and 53mbbl/d of imports. The shortfall in domestic production has been met by imports for many years and this has steadily grown from 22mbbl/d in 2005 along with the increasing demand for refined products. The shortfall suggests that there is scope to increase throughput of the refinery and reduce the level of imports.

Kenya Refined Products Production and Consumption
Source: Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, Kenya Petroleum Refineries Limited, OGInsights

The refinery has a design capacity of 80mbbl/d, but has continually operated at c.40% of capacity. This low utilisation is due to a number of reasons including regular utility supply outages, limitation on size of cargoes it can accommodate, low profitability (some batches of processing are loss making), limitation on product slate and general inefficiency of the refinery. The refinery has a reformer and a catalytic hydro-treater, but no upgrading units; the refinery’s two complexes were commissioned in 1963 and 1974 with minimal investment since. The profitability of the refinery was further hit in 2013 when the incoming government removed the price protection previously provided to the refinery, making it uncompetitive relative to refined product imports.

The refinery’s current configuration is designed to handle heavy crude grades from the Middle East. In 2012, a refinery upgrade project was considered by the then owners (50% Essar Energy, 50% Government of Kenya). The plans included changing the configuration to handle lighter crudes and would incorporate the ability to process Lokichar crude. However, the $1.5bn cost of the upgrade was deemed to be too expensive and uneconomic; as a result the upgrade was abandoned, following which, Essar Energy decided to exit the joint venture. In December 2014, Essar Energy sold its 50% interest in the refinery to the Government of Kenya.

The refinery has been mothballed since mid-2013 and now acts as a storage facility for imported refined products. All demand for refined products are now met by imports. There are currently no plans to restart the refinery, and without further investment, it is unlikely the refinery would be able to operate profitably. Until there is a plan and willing financing to upgrade the refinery, the destination for Lokichar crude is most likely to be the export market - in its current state, the refinery configuration is not designed to process Lokichar crude.

In a scenario where the refinery was upgraded and being wholly fed by Lokichar crude, then feedstock requirements could reach c.100mbbl/d by 2020 in order to fully meet forecast domestic demand for refined products (96mbbl/d estimate by Kenya Petroleum Refineries Limited). However, this scenario is deemed to be highly unlikely in the foreseeable future.

Read More

Lundin stops funding Africa Oil

Africa Oil’s history dates back to 1983, when it was founded as Canmex Minerals with funding from the Lundin family. The company was officially renamed to Africa Oil in June 2009 to reflect its strategic and geographic focus. Since 2009, the company went through a series of acquisitions to consolidate its position in Kenya and Ethiopia.

Read More

Pricing Kenyan crude

The price a crude fetches is typically against a benchmark such as Brent, WTI or Urals and the underlying crude marketing agreement will detail the calculation of the premium or discount to such a benchmark as well as other adjustments. As Kenyan crude has never been marketed before, there is no established pricing for Lokichar crude – however, a hypothetical value can be calculated. One of the key determinants of crude pricing is crude quality with the heaviness (API gravity) and sourness (sulphur content) often being a point of focus.

The heaviness of a crude is measured in °API and is a measurement of how heavy or light a crude is compared to water. Crude with an above 10°API is lighter than and will therefore float on water (i.e. is less dense). Heavier crude oils have longer hydrocarbon chain lengths and are generally less desirable as it is more difficult to convert them into more useful petroleum products. Light crude oil is defined as having an API gravity of greater than 31.1° API and a heavy crude oil has an API gravity of below 22.3° API.

The sourness of a crude is a measure of the level of sulphur by weight. Crude with less than 0.5% sulphur is considered sweet and above this level is sour. Sour crude is less desirable as the sulphur is a corrosive material and requires more processing; there are also increasingly strict limits on the sulphur content of gasoline and other petroleum products.

Amosing well testshave flowed oil between 31° to 38° API and is therefore considered a light oil; sulphur content is generally less than 0.1%. Based on test results to date, Lokichar crude is relatively high quality and should fetch pricing broadly in line with Brent (see bubble chart).

Other determinants of crude oil pricing are:

• Location - the total cost to a buyer is the wellhead price plus the cost of transportation and freight which will be benchmarked against other sources of supply
• Logistics – for long haul crudes, larger parcels tend to command a premium as per unit freight costs are lower; this also requires the loading and destination ports to be able handle larger vessels as well as having sufficient storage facilities
• Destination – refineries have different configurations in that they are setup to process different kinds of crudes. Not all refineries require light, sweet crudes and some are built to handle heavier crudes and will desire certain crude blends over others 

Refiners pay particular attention to the crude assay, or the chemical composition of the crude – this goes beyond looking at the API gravity and sulphur content mentioned above. For example, the pour point, wax content, level of other impurities are important considerations and depending on the refinery product slate, the refinery yields are also key (this refers to the relative proportion of the different hydrocarbon chain lengths in the oil). BP’s assay for Brent is shown below.

Read More

Battle of the routes

Significant resources have been discovered in East Africa with 1.7bnbbl lying in Uganda and 600mmbbl in Kenya. The key barrier to monetising the vast amounts of oil is an export pipeline. In 2010, when Tullow acquired Heritage’s acreage, first oil was envisaged for 2016. Over the last five years, this timing has slowly crept back with estimates now pushed back to late-2019 despite government PR continuing to promote first oil in 2016-17.

There remains a significant risk that the timeline will be delayed further as the regional governments have yet to decide on a route. There are currently two routes under consideration, a Northern Route and a Southern Route. The governments’ preference is for a Northern Route which aligns with a wider regional plan for the development of a trade corridor from South Sudan through to the Port of Lamu in Kenya. In 2010, the LAPSSET (Lamu-South Sudan-Ethiopia) study was commissioned to explore a road and railway path as part of this plan, which also considered a concurrent pipeline as part of the development. In 2014, the Northern Route for a pipeline was further advanced with the governments engaging Toyota to select the actual path for the Northern Route and to carry out pre-FEED – this work is expected to be completed in May 2015.

The upstream partners have commissioned their own study into a Southern Route, which is to run parallel to the existing Mombasa-Eldoret products pipeline. Whilst this will utilise existing rights of way and road networks which will aid accessibility and construction, the higher population density along this route vs. the Northern Route could pose its own challenges.

To date, the governments’ focus remains on the Northern Route and they have given little consideration to the alternative Southern Route. The upstream partners continue to lobby the governments on the Southern Route which is seen as logistically less challenging. However, political impetus may override any economic and logistical considerations in choosing the final route, and until one is chosen, Uganda and Kenya’s discovered resources remain stranded.

Read More