Saudi Arabia - joining the dots

A series of blog entries exploring Saudi Arabia's role in the oil markets with a brief look at the history of the royal family and politics that dictate and influence the Kingdom's oil policy

AIM - Assets In Market

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Iran negotiations - is the end nigh?

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Yemen: The Islamic Chessboard?

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Acquisition Criteria

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Valuation Series

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Showing posts with label Russia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Russia. Show all posts

Wednesday, 25 March 2020

Oil giants posturing


Since the collapse of the OPEC+ meetings and in the wake of seismic demand destruction from COVID-19, both Saudi Arabia and Russia have been in a battle of who will blink first with commitments to increase production in the hopes of forcing the other back to the table to recommence production cut discussions. However as of today, there has been no face saving solution for either to MBS or Putin to back down and even Trump's calls to OPEC/Russia to (ironically) help lift oil prices have been ignored.

Despite the strong stance and hard talk by MBS and Putin, neither Saudi or Russia have actually significantly ramped up oil production to date. State-controlled oil companies in the two countries have reportedly hesitated before ramping up production in a show of careful navigation to avoid sending the entire oil & gas industry into oblivion in the potential absence of a winner-takes-all outcome which is becoming more and more apparent.

Sunday, 17 November 2019

PGNiG confirms termination of Russian gas imports from end 2022

Poland's PGNiG has notified Gazprom of its intention to terminate imports of Russian pipeline gas from the end of 2022.


This will now increase the country's reliant on US LNG (which at this time many US Gulf Coast LNG projects still have to be sanctioned and not guaranteed to come online) and the long awaited Baltic pipeline to take Norwegian gas to Poland.


The move is not a big surprise and is completely consistent with all the messages the Poland has been giving over the past few years including aggressively signing up US LNG volumes.


Poland consumes around 17 bcm of gas annually, more than half of which comes from Gazprom under a long-term contract that expires at the end of 2022. It has used the upcoming expiry as an opportunity to diversify its gas supply ahead of time and has consistently stressed that Gazprom is charging Poland too much for the gas noting that Russia has taken advantage of the historic lack of other sources of gas which is now rapidly changing with the advent of LNG.


Related links:

Sunday, 18 November 2018

PGNiG shuns Russian gas

PGNiG is increasingly boldening its signals on shunning Russian gas as it turns to the west. The Polish state has historically been dependent on gas imports from its eastern neighbour but is looking to loosen its reliance to the communist state.

Poland consumes around 17 bcm of gas annually, more than half of which comes from Gazprom under a long-term contract that expires in 2022. It is seeing the upcoming expiry as the opportunity to diversify its gas supply ahead of time and has consistently stressed that Gazprom is charging Poland too much for the gas noting that Russia has taken advantage of the historic lack of other sources of gas which is now changing with the advent of LNG.

Poland has also vehemently opposed plans by Russia to build a new gas pipeline across the Baltic Sea which is aimed at strengthening its dominant market position into Europe. Instead Poland is looking to sanction the Baltic gas pipeline later this year or beginning of 2019 which will bring gas directly from Norway.

The last month has seen a flurry of newsflow around PGNiG’s activity in sourcing new gas.

In mid-October, PGNiG finalised terms with Venture Global for 2mtpa of LNG. It will buy LNG for 20 years on a FOB basis with supplies commencing under two contracts for 2022 and 2023. The FOB contracts are deemed attractive for PGNiG as it can choose to take the LNG to Poland or use it in its trading portfolio. The terms are not disclosed but understood to be in line with other Gulf Coast LNG contracts being 115% x Henry Hub plus a toll of c.USD2.50/mmbtu. Venture Global is currently developing the Calcasieu Pass LNG terminal on the US Gulf Coast.


This has been followed by a 24 year LNG deal with Cheniere Energy at the beginning of November. PGNiG has signed up a 1.45mtpa deal with LNG supplied by Cheniere’s Sabine Pass, Louisiana and Corpus Cristi, Texas liquefaction plants. The contract is for delivery on a DES basis directly to the 5Bcm/year Swinoujscie terminal in Poland. Poland is also looking to expand the import terminal to 7.5Bcm/year in part of the countries grander ambitions to become a LNG and gas trading hub.

PGNiG also farmed-in to the Tommeliten Alpha in the Norwegian North Sea on the upstream side at the end of October. See PGNiG expands footprint in Norway.

#PGNiG #LNG #Russia #Gazprom #VentureGlobal #Cheniere

Saturday, 16 June 2018

Saudi and Russia dominate gossip columns in run up to June OPEC meeting



As we approach the June OPEC meeting, all eyes on Saudi Arabia and Russia for any clues on the direction they will go on 22nd June. With the sanctions on Iran and imminent collapse of Venezuela, Trump has asked the two power weights to step in to avoid oil prices going any higher. This in itself is ironic as the US has been trying to wean itself off imports and attain energy independence from OPEC, yet it is now openly asking Saudi Arabia to help.

In recent days, both Saudi Arabia and Russia have hinted at wanting to increase production by 300mbopd, although the details remain to be thrashed out- i.e. will it be these two countries shouldering the increase or will it be spread amongst the OPEC members. The path this will take and desire to increase production will be dictated by whether consensus can be reached next week.

On the one hand, keeping a lid of oil prices is important for OPEC to avoid a wave of US production coming onstream with producer hedging. On the other hand, a number of OPEC nations urgently require cash flow from higher oil prices to balance precarious budgets.

If consensus can be reached to increase production, the additional barrels can be met by Saudi Arabia and Russia making up the production but will likely be criticised by other OPEC members of using the opportunity to snatch market share. An alternative would be for the members’ quotas to be renegotiated although this will open up another can of worms. In the case of the latter, it is noted that not all members are in a position to raise production (e.g. Venezuela, Nigeria, Libya which are fraught with domestic difficulties). Finally, OPEC members have been in over compliance so there remains running room to utilise the existing quotas, although this will again be shouldered by Saudi Arabia and Russia.

In the medium and longer term, fundamentals point to a supply shortfall so gradually raising production now will keep prices under control although the path ahead will remain choppy.

Tuesday, 12 September 2017

OPEC may extend yet


Saudi Arabia has been working tirelessly behind the scenes and appears to be gaining good momentum with the major actors of OPEC + 1 (i.e. Russia) for extending the OPEC output agreement beyond April 2018. Saudi Arabia and its new ally, Russia, are keenly in favour of maintaining the cuts until June 2018 and several other producers have recently signaled their support for an extension as well.

Iran: Initially one of the tougher partners at the November 2016 pact discussions given its demand to return to pre-sanction production levels, Iran has played along with the creation of the special cap arrangement. Iranian oil minister, Bijan Zanganeh, has indicated that the country “will cooperate with the majority” on any extension proposal.

Iraq: Has publicly been a vocal critic of the current arrangements arguing that it was not exempt from the cuts (like Libya and Nigeria) as it needed funding to fight the war with Islamic State. Iraqi oil minister, Jabbar al Luiebi, has also been critical of the fact that Iraq has not been allowed to use its own numbers for the calculation of the output cut). Up until now, Iraq has been sending mixed signals about whether it would actually agree to any extension. However the Saudi oil minister, Khalid al-Falih, has been working behind the scenes and made a special visit to Baghdad in May before the OPEC meeting to ensure that Iraq would agree to a 9-month timeframe. Saudi’s diplomatic efforts may have paid off as Iraq is now softening its tone and affirming its commitment to the current agreement; in August 2017, Luiebi stated during a visit to Moscow that it would go along with an extension if one is agreed.