Iran framework agreement - Kerry makes the rounds with the P5+1 and Gulf States

Over the past few weeks, John Kerry has been busy meeting with his P5+1 counterparts and members of the Gulf States in the run up to the 31 March 2015 deadline for the framework agreement on the Iranian nuclear programme.

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Iran negotiation: an untimely letter

On 9 March 2015, Republican senators issued an open letter to Iran that essentially warned the latter any deal entered into with President Obama would be considered an "executive agreement" that would require Congress ratification and more importantly, could be revoked by the next president.

The message it clearly sends out is that the US could back out of any agreed nuclear deal, raising serious doubts on whether the US will keep up its side of any bargain, including the lifting of sanctions. The letter was drafted by freshman Republican Senator Tom Cotton and signed by 46 other Republican senators. The timing of the letter is a major blow to the framework agreement which is due to be made by the end of March.

Hilary Clinton has denounced the letter saying that "these senators were trying to be helpful to the Iranians or
harmful to the commander-in-chief in the midst of high-stakes international diplomacy", while John Kerry called it "absolutely calculated...and unthought-out". Even Iran's foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, found the move by the select Republicans distasteful.

Cotton defended the letter and said that Obama is "negotiating a deal that is going to put Iran on a path to a
bomb". This in itself is a weak argument as the lack of action by the international community could also see Iran ramping up its enrichment programme and further developing nuclear capabilities. Whilst Iran could argue in future that any slight slip up by the US as reneging on an agreement, it is likely that this would be one of a myriad of excuses that they could use.

It is also worth scrutinising the letter further.

1. The letter suggests that a "mere executive agreement" holds little sway in terms of power, yet it is worth remembering that the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq was by such executive agreement and not a treaty.
2. It is also untrue to say that "future Congresses could modify the terms of the agreement at any time" - Congress cannot renegotiate such an agreement, but can pass legislation to contradict it and therefore nullify its terms.
3. Also, the claim that the next president "could revoke the agreement" neglects the fact that the agreement will become binding international law through a UN Security Council resolution.

The letter muddies the water at a bad time (or a good time as some may say) as the negotiations intensify over the next few weeks. Although the damage to the negotiations and to President Obama's authority can be contained, it further chips away at the delicate pillars which have supported the efforts of the P5+1 which have progressed the discussions with Iran to the point they are at today.

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Saudi Arabia - joining the dots: Part 6 - Emergency meeting

Saudi Arabia - joining the dots is a series of blog entries exploring Saudi Arabia's role in the oil markets with a brief look at the history of the royal family and politics that dictate and influence the Kingdom's oil policy.

Part 6 - Emergency meeting

OPEC's traditional strategy has been to cut production to maintain prices, but recent behaviour of the cartel or at least that of its largest member (and swing producer) shows a marked deviation from the strategy.

Saudi Arabia has been a key driver of the protect market share strategy, convincing other OPEC members that a period of low prices would cut US supply and therefore restore the supply-demand dynamics of the market. However, Al-Naimi's stance of keeping to this strategy "even if prices hit USD20 a barrel" (December 2014) has scared the other OPEC members, who do not have the deep pockets to keep their countries afloat.

Nine months into the oil price decline, many of the members are feeling the pressure with fiscal reserves running low. Saudi Arabia and its Gulf neighbours are the exception with their vast monetary reserves, but with large social spending programmes, these countries are now running deficits and chipping away at those reserves.

Discussions between the various OPEC members on the next course of action are ongoing with the next meeting scheduled for June 2015. However, in February 2015, Ms Alison-Madueke, president of OPEC said in an interview with the FT that if the oil price "slips any further, it is highly likely that I will have to call an extraordinary meeting of OPEC in the next six weeks or so". Extraordinary meetings have to be agreed upon by all 12 members.

Ms Alison-Madueke also admitted that "When you cede market share continuously, you drive yourself into oblivion...many OPEC members are going to suffer greatly from a a drastic fall in the price". There-in lies the dilemma - the OPEC members' problem lies in the deeply rooted dependence on oil revenues and large social programmes; cutting production risks further loss of oil revenue, while maintaining production keeps the oil price low...and no-one wants to be first mover. Huge structural reforms are needed but these will not be easy, especially in the aftermath of the Arab Spring and will likely take many decades to achieve.

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Saudi Arabia - joining the dots: Part 5 - Breakeven, OPEC's downfall

Saudi Arabia - joining the dots is a series of blog entries exploring Saudi Arabia's role in the oil markets with a brief look at the history of the royal family and politics that dictate and influence the Kingdom's oil policy.

Part 5 - Breakeven, OPEC's downfall

The above chart, taken from the Wall Street Journal, paints a grim picture.  It shows the oil price required by the various OPEC members to meet their budgets. As of 10 October 2014, Brent was at USD90/bbl; today it is at USD62/bbl. All the OPEC countries are in the red, and some are in a worse position to handle this low oil price environment than others.

Saudi Arabia, for now, will be able to survive. Others are crying in pain - Venezuela, Iran and as of late, Nigeria as it enters into a period of elections with campaigns funded by oil money and the corrupt paid off with oil money. As an interesting aside, Iran (a Shiite power) blames its neighbour and rival, the Sunni Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for using the oil prices as a political weapon and keeping prices low by refusing to cut production.

After years of high oil prices, Saudi Arabia has managed to amass over USD750bn in reserves. However, it also has a large social programme and a high youth unemployment rate; keeping its citizens content and off the street has been in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. Following the ousting of Egypt's Hosni Mubarak, King Abdullah implemented $130bn in new social programmes including unemployment payments, housing and scholarships for Saudi's to study abroad. 

Most worryingly, Saudi Arabia tends to outspend its budget and the Kingdom will need to run a deficit in a USD50-60/bbl oil price environment.

Saudi Arabia has issued a record budget of USD229bn for 2015, with a 5% deficit forecast. The split is as follows: 25% education, 19% health and social, 7% transport and infrastructure, 7% water and agriculture, 5% municipal and 36% "other priorities". Other priorities is largely composed of military spend, which is of increasing importance with the ongoing ISIS conflict in the region.

Al-Naimi's policy has been to defend market share, to the annoyance of King Salman, at the expense of allowing oil prices to fall. However, with oil prices at their current low levels, Saudi Arabia is chipping away at its massive monetary reserves with an over-inflated and hard to cut back spending programme. This policy (or Al-Naimi) may need to be changed in the absence of an oil price rebound in 2015.

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Saudi Arabia - joining the dots: Part 4 - The price wars, defending market share

Saudi Arabia - joining the dots is a series of blog entries exploring Saudi Arabia's role in the oil markets with a brief look at the history of the royal family and politics that dictate and influence the Kingdom's oil policy.

Part 4 - The price wars, defending market share

The sudden fall in the oil price in the middle of 2014 and the subsequent lack of response by OPEC is a stark reminder of its members' policy of defending market share, although the cartel may openly deny it .

Forgotten in recent years and beyond recollection for those who are still young, the 1980s was the last time Saudi Arabia demonstrated its significant power in the oil markets in its efforts to defend market share. In hindsight, one questions whether Saudi emerged victorious from that war and whether it was worth fighting.

In the early 1980s, oil prices fell to record lows after hitting highs in the 1970s. Consumers (namely the US) vowed to reduce reliance of on oil given the high prices and actively implemented policy to switch to substitute energy sources, such as coal for power generation. 

In an effort to shore up oil prices caused by falling demand, Saudi urged its fellow OPEC members to cut production. Saudi cut its own production by c.80% to 3.5mmbbl/d, but many of the other members refused to follow suit. Saudi was furious as by taking action, it had lost out on revenue and market share. In retaliation to the non-compliers, Saudi ramped up production to full capacity and flooded the market with crude. The excess production caused oil prices to slump to c.USD7/bbl and it was another 20 years, before oil price began to recover to pre 1980 levels.

That part of history continues to haunt Saudi today and one can see its remnants in Saudi's stern policy of maintaining production, communicated to the world in that all important OPEC meeting on 27 November 2014.

Luckily for Saudi, and other OPEC members, its low cost of production (<USD20/bbl) means that production remains profitable even at USD50/bbl oil price. The current price war will see much production around the world being choked with high cost North American unconventionals and mature North Sea production being hurt.

Whether Saudi still holds (or wishes to hold) its nominated role of swing producer is a key question to ask. For now, it still has the ability to retrench production, but its low cost production base will mean it can withstand lower oil prices for longer whereas its non-OPEC counterparts will fall over one-by-one unless prices rebound in the near future.

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Saudi Arabia - joining the dots: Part 3 - The reshuffling has begun

Saudi Arabia - joining the dots is a series of blog entries exploring Saudi Arabia's role in the oil markets with a brief look at the history of the royal family and politics that dictate and influence the Kingdom's oil policy.

Part 3 - The reshuffling has begun

Ali al-Niami's job remains safe...for now

In a further move which signals King Salman's tightening grip over the Kingdom's affairs since coming to power,  Salman promoted his son Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman from the position of Assistant Minister for Petroleum Affairs to Deputy Oil Minister at the end of January 2015.

The move, although unexpected, should not be seen as a surprise given Salman's desire to place members of the Sadairi branch of the family into key positions.

Ali al-Niami's post as Oil Minister remains safe for now but his power in dictating Saudi oil policy, arguably the one of the most important roles in the Kingdom, is quickly diminishing. The re-shuffling is also symbolically important as it could be the first in a number of moves by Salman to sideline al-Niami and his policy of defending Saudi market share and letting oil prices fall to USD50/bbl - a policy which does not sit well with factions within the Saudi governing circle.

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Natuna Sea Block A PSC ("NSBA")

• KUFPEC (33.33%), PMO (28.67%*), Petronas (15%), Pertamina (11.5%), PTTEP (11.5%)
• Pertamina and PTTEP acquired their stakes as part of Hess' Indonesian portfolio
• NSBA supplies gas to SembGas in Singapore, together with South Natuna Sea Block B and Kakap, as part of a GSA signed in 1999 for a period of 22 years
• In 2008, PMO signed two additional GSAs to supply NSBA gas for power generation in Batam, Indonesia
• Due to delay in constructing the pipeline to Batam, a swap agreement has been signed for the Batam earmarked gas to be supplied to Singapore and another field to supply Batam instead
• The largest field on the block is Anoa which contains about half of the PSC's gas reserves. Gas from Anoa, Pelikan, Bison and Gajah Puteri are dedicated to the SembGas 1 GSA
• SembGas 2 is predominantly supplied by Gajah Baru which was developed as a second phase of NSBA
• Crude is piped by an 8" pipeline to the Anoa Natuna FPSO for processing and storage
• Gas is exported via the West Natuna Transportation System (operated by COP) and serves the three Natuna PSCs (NSBA, South Natuna Block B and Kakap)
• The network consists of 656km of pipeline, with a 470km section transporting the gas to Singapore
• A pipeline connecting the system to Batam is also planned but is the responsibility of the buyers of the gas
• The pipeline costs are recoverable under the PSCs

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