Saudi Arabia - joining the dots

A series of blog entries exploring Saudi Arabia's role in the oil markets with a brief look at the history of the royal family and politics that dictate and influence the Kingdom's oil policy

AIM - Assets In Market

AIM - Lorem Ipsum Lorem Ipsum Lorem Ipsum Lorem Ipsum Lorem Ipsum Lorem Ipsum Lorem Ipsum Lorem Ipsum Lorem Ipsum Lorem Ipsum Lorem Ipsum

Iran negotiations - is the end nigh?

Lorem Ipsum Lorem Ipsum Lorem Ipsum Lorem Ipsum Lorem Ipsum Lorem Ipsum Lorem Ipsum Lorem Ipsum Lorem Ipsum Lorem Ipsum Lorem Ipsum Lorem Ipsum Lorem Ipsum

Yemen: The Islamic Chessboard?

Lorem Ipsum Lorem Ipsum Lorem Ipsum Lorem Ipsum Lorem Ipsum Lorem Ipsum Lorem Ipsum Lorem Ipsum Lorem Ipsum Lorem Ipsum Lorem Ipsum Lorem Ipsum Lorem Ipsum

Acquisition Criteria

Lorem Ipsum Lorem Ipsum Lorem Ipsum Lorem Ipsum Lorem Ipsum Lorem Ipsum Lorem Ipsum Lorem Ipsum Lorem Ipsum Lorem Ipsum Lorem Ipsum Lorem Ipsum Lorem Ipsum

Valuation Series

Lorem Ipsum Lorem Ipsum Lorem Ipsum Lorem Ipsum Lorem Ipsum Lorem Ipsum Lorem Ipsum Lorem Ipsum Lorem Ipsum Lorem Ipsum Lorem Ipsum Lorem Ipsum Lorem Ipsum

Wednesday 1 April 2015

Saleh: Enemies become allies


The Houthi movement was founded in the 1990s to revive a branch of Shia Islam known as Zaidism. Historically the Zaidis had ruled over North Yemen until their toppling in 1962 during the Yemen Civil War. Since then, they have been increasingly marginalised by the new regime which viewed Zaidism as a threat.

In the beginning, the Houthi movement was peaceful. It sought a voice in a regime where it was being opressed. It called for a partnership with President Saleh to work things out and not for his overthrow. However, the Houthis also saw the United States as an enemy of Islam and President Saleh’s alliance with the US on the “War on Terror” shaped the events that followed.

President Saleh was seen by the Houthis as a traitor; the Houthis were vocal in pushing for his ousting. In response, President Saleh stepped up efforts to repress the movement, including attacks on Houthi villages. The movement became increasingly military in order to defend itself with six wars being waged upon them by the Saleh Government between 2004 and 2010. The wars led to massive deaths in the Sadaa region, the stronghold of the Houthis, and had the effect of alienating much of the Northern Yemeni population.

The Arab Spring came at an opportune time for the Houthis who capitalised on the Yemeni’s discontent with the government and lack of progress on the economic and security fronts; the Houthis openly supported the protests against President Saleh. Following the removal of President Saleh, the Houthis stepped up as a candidate to fill the power vacuum and vowed to set up its own political party to participate in the country’s next elections. Support for the Houthis grew, although its appeal was probably less to do with its ideology and more of a common hatred against Saleh’s repressive regime.

The Houthis realised that in order to be heard and to make an impact, it would have to do so through the political arena which would legitimise the movement. However, it is now becoming evident that its extension into politics is part of a grander plan to gain governing and military dominance. Three years after the Arab Spring, Yemen’s interim government headed by President Hadi, had yet to make any noticeable improvements to the country. The Houthis saw this as the time to act and in 2014, launched an aggressive military campaign in the north of Yemen culminating in the capture of the capital Sanaa in September 2014. Government departments and the airport were seized and President Hadi was placed under house arrest. The capture of Sanaa was months, if not years in the planning. By mid 2014, the Houthi’s had already surrounded the capital and its final move into the city was executed at lightening speed.

The Houthi’s could not have achieved all this without military support. In a twist of events, this support is coming from ex-President Saleh, who once upon a time, aggressively tried to crush the Houthis during his reign. Saleh’s loyal followers, including those in the country’s army and security services have aided the advance of the Houthis, or in some cases actively chose not to protect against their advances. The Houthi alliance with Saleh is a strange one, but one that has allowed the former to widen and strengthen its grip and the latter to orchestrate the destruction of the new regime and the Hadi government, an act of revenge against those who overthrew him.  How long this alliance lasts, only time will tell, but probably for no longer than one needs the other.

Monday 30 March 2015

Yemen: The Islamic Chessboard


Houthi take Sana (check), 
Saudi airstrike,
Next move...

Since the start of the year, the Houthis have risen to fame in the drama that is the Middle East. There was little media coverage of the group previously due to their modest beginnings, but also the difficulty of doing serious investigative journalism in Yemen (due to safety and security). However, the increasing threat of the Houthis is now taking centre stage and the international community is paying more attention.

Yemen: The Islamic Chessboard is a series examining the rise of the Houthis and the conflict in Yemen. For now, Yemen appears to be the battle ground in the continuing fight between the Shias and the Sunnis.

Saturday 28 March 2015

Tullow in the middle



The fight for oil is nothing new – ownership of oil commands tremendous wealth. Countries fight over the black stuff in wars, and perhaps less barbarically nowadays across a table. Individuals go after it in the hope of getting rich, as evidenced by the large number of independents that have popped up in the past couple of decades.

Monday 23 March 2015

Iran negotiations: the US conundrum


The intensifying rift between President Obama and Congress poses a risk that could derail the Iranian nuclear talks.
Republican Bob Corker, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has sponsored the Iran Nuclear Negotiations Act of 2014 which calls for the President to submit any Iranian deal to Congress for approval. The bill would remove the President’s current authority to waive any sanctions imposed by the legislature. In short, Congress will have the final vote on any deal with Iran.
The Foreign Relations Committee will vote on the bill on 26 March and if approved, would move to a vote in the Senate. Should it progress beyond the Senate, Obama retains the right to veto the bill, however, given the Republican majority and signs of Democrat support for the bill’s measures, the bill could become veto proof.
The passing of such a bill would more than throw a spanner in the works and could seriously scupper the negotiations as well as reverse the progress made to date. It would raise further questions around President Obama’s authority in international negotiations which have already been partly undermined by the Republican letter to Iran on 9 March.
A scenario that could play out, should the bill be implemented, is the blaming of the US by the international community on the breakdown of the nuclear negotiations (should it occur). The US would no longer be seen as a reliable and trustworthy partner which would make it difficult for the US to garner future support for additional sanctions against Iran.

Wednesday 18 March 2015

Afren - A Shakespearen Tragedy

The story of Afren has the makings of a Shakespearean tragedy. The protagonist is one of the largest and most successful international E&P companies. Its fall from grace is swift as a corruption scandal unfolds and the company falls victim to fate - the fall in oil price drowns the company in debt. There is a slither of hope towards the end as Seplat steps in with an offer to save the company, but all is lost when the merger talks are terminated. Afren meets its downfall when the creditors circle in, taking away whatever dignity is left as the company lies in a helpless and weakened state. The proposed restructuring by the bondholders leaves existing shareholders massively diluted who are left with just 11% of their original holding.

This series chronicles the rise and fall of Afren, our flawed hero, with a share price high of 170p at the beginning of 2014 which falls to 5p at its demise.

Iran framework agreement - Kerry makes the rounds with the P5+1 and Gulf States



Over the past few weeks, John Kerry has been busy meeting with his P5+1 counterparts and members of the Gulf States in the run up to the 31 March 2015 deadline for the framework agreement on the Iranian nuclear programme.

Tuesday 10 March 2015

Iran negotiation: an untimely letter



On 9 March 2015, Republican senators issued an open letter to Iran that essentially warned the latter any deal entered into with President Obama would be considered an "executive agreement" that would require Congress ratification and more importantly, could be revoked by the next president.

The message it clearly sends out is that the US could back out of any agreed nuclear deal, raising serious doubts on whether the US will keep up its side of any bargain, including the lifting of sanctions. The letter was drafted by freshman Republican Senator Tom Cotton and signed by 46 other Republican senators. The timing of the letter is a major blow to the framework agreement which is due to be made by the end of March.

Hilary Clinton has denounced the letter saying that "these senators were trying to be helpful to the Iranians or
harmful to the commander-in-chief in the midst of high-stakes international diplomacy", while John Kerry called it "absolutely calculated...and unthought-out". Even Iran's foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, found the move by the select Republicans distasteful.

Cotton defended the letter and said that Obama is "negotiating a deal that is going to put Iran on a path to a
bomb". This in itself is a weak argument as the lack of action by the international community could also see Iran ramping up its enrichment programme and further developing nuclear capabilities. Whilst Iran could argue in future that any slight slip up by the US as reneging on an agreement, it is likely that this would be one of a myriad of excuses that they could use.

It is also worth scrutinising the letter further.

  1. The letter suggests that a "mere executive agreement" holds little sway in terms of power, yet it is worth remembering that the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq was by such executive agreement and not a treaty.
  2. It is also untrue to say that "future Congresses could modify the terms of the agreement at any time" - Congress cannot renegotiate such an agreement, but can pass legislation to contradict it and therefore nullify its terms.
  3. Also, the claim that the next president "could revoke the agreement" neglects the fact that the agreement will become binding international law through a UN Security Council resolution.

The letter muddies the water at a bad time (or a good time as some may say) as the negotiations intensify over the next few weeks. Although the damage to the negotiations and to President Obama's authority can be contained, it further chips away at the delicate pillars which have supported the efforts of the P5+1 which have progressed the discussions with Iran to the point they are at today.